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• Individuals with and without autism completed a composite face procedure 
• The strength of facial emotion cues in the distractor regions was manipulated 
• High-emotion distractor regions produced stronger composite face effects 
• Similar modulation by facial emotion was seen in both groups 





Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD; autistic individuals) may exhibit atypical 
face perception because they fail to process faces holistically. In the context of this 
hypothesis, it is critical to determine whether autistic individuals exhibit diminished 
susceptibility to the composite face illusion, widely regarded as key marker of holistic face 
processing. To date, however, previous studies have yielded inconsistent findings. In light of 
recent evidence suggesting that facial emotion cues increase the strength of the composite 
face illusion in typical individuals, the present study sought to determine whether the 
presence of facial emotion also modulates the strength of the composite face illusion in 
autistic individuals, many of whom experience difficulties recognizing facial expressions. We 
therefore measured composite face effects in a sample of autistic individuals (N = 20) and 
matched typical controls (N = 29) using an incidental emotion procedure in which distractor 
regions varied systematically in their emotion strength. As expected, the presence of facial 
emotion in the distractor regions of composite face arrangements increased the strength of the 
illusory distortion induced. The extent of the modulation by facial emotion was similar in the 
two groups. The composite effects seen in the ASD group were qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar to those seen in the typical group, suggestive of intact holistic 
processing in this population.  
 





Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by 
difficulties with social interaction and communication, as well as restricted interests and 
repetitive behaviors (APA, 2013). While not a diagnostic marker of ASD, atypical face 
perception is also thought to be common in this population (Simmons et al., 2009; Webb, 
Neuhaus, & Faja, 2016). For example, many studies have observed difficulties recognizing 
facial identity in individuals with ASD (Boucher & Lewis, 1992; Hedley, Brewer, & Young, 
2011; Wallace, Coleman, & Bailey, 2008a; Weigelt, Koldewyn, & Kanwisher, 2012). 
Autistic people1 often have difficulties learning faces from multiple encounters; i.e., they 
derive less benefit from seeing the same face in different poses, and under differ viewing 
conditions, than typical observers (Ipser, Ring, Murphy, Gaigg, & Cook, 2016). Many 
autistic individuals also exhibit atypical perception of facial motion (O'Brien, Spencer, 
Girges, Johnston, & Hill, 2014; P. Shah, Bird, & Cook, 2016). Where observed, atypical face 
perception may hamper social interaction and contribute to the emergence of the wider socio-
cognitive features of ASD (Klin, Schultz, & Jones, 2015; Schultz, 2005; P. Shah, Gaule, Bird, 
& Cook, 2013). 
 
Expert face perception is thought to involve holistic processing, whereby local features are 
integrated into a unified whole (Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998; Maurer, Le Grand, & 
Mondloch, 2002; McKone & Yovel, 2009; Piepers & Robbins, 2013). Interestingly, however, 
people with ASD are thought to focus on local stimulus features, a tendency that may 
undermine their ability to form integrated global percepts (Behrmann, Thomas, & 
Humphreys, 2006; Happé, 1999; Happé & Frith, 2006). For example, those with ASD often 
perform well on the Embedded Figures Task, in which observers must disregard a complex 
global pattern in order to locate a particular local element (Ropar & Mitchell, 2001; A. Shah 
& Frith, 1983). Some evidence also suggests that autistic individuals exhibit reduced 
susceptibility to visual illusions induced by context (Happé, 1996; P. Shah et al., 2016), and 
reduced global-to-local interference when responding to (“Navon”) compound letter stimuli 
(Behrmann, Avidan, et al., 2006; see also Koldewyn, Jiang, Weigelt, & Kanwisher, 2013). 
Individuals with ASD may therefore exhibit atypical face perception because they fail to 




In light of this possibility, several studies have sought to determine whether autistic 
individuals show reduced susceptibility to the composite face illusion (Gauthier, Klaiman, & 
Schultz, 2009; Nishimura, Rutherford, & Maurer, 2008; Teunisse & de Gelder, 2003; 
Ventura et al., 2018). When the upper half of one face (the target region) is aligned with the 
lower half of another (the distractor region), the face halves appear to ‘fuse’ perceptually. The 
illusory distortion induced by the distractor region hampers observers’ ability to make 
perceptual judgements about the target (Hole, 1994; Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987). 
Crucially, this composite face illusion suggests a tendency to integrate information from 
different facial regions, and is therefore regarded as a key marker of holistic face processing 
(Murphy, Gray, & Cook, 2017; Rossion, 2013). Reduced susceptibility to the composite face 
illusion would therefore indicate that individuals with ASD fail to process faces holistically. 
Thus far, however, findings have been inconsistent; while some studies have reported 
atypical composite effects in ASD (Gauthier et al., 2009; Teunisse & de Gelder, 2003), others 
have described typical susceptibility to the illusion (Nishimura et al., 2008; Ventura et al., 
2018).  
 
Previous studies of composite face processing in ASD (Gauthier et al., 2009; Nishimura et 
al., 2008; Teunisse & de Gelder, 2003; Ventura et al., 2018) have used composite 
arrangements constructed from emotionally neutral faces (from photographs of actors who 
have been asked to convey no emotion). This is the conventional approach when using the 
composite face paradigm to measure individual differences in holistic processing (e.g., 
Konar, Bennett, & Sekuler, 2010; Rezlescu, Susilo, Wilmer, & Caramazza, 2017; Richler, 
Cheung, & Gauthier, 2011; Wang, Li, Fang, Tian, & Liu, 2012). However, recent work 
indicates that the strength of the composite face illusion is greatly increased by the presence 
of facial emotion cues in the distractor facial region (Gray, Murphy, Marsh, & Cook, 2017). 
Emotional expressions are a strong source of correlated change across distal facial regions 
(Cook, Aichelburg, & Johnston, 2015; Jack, Garrod, & Schyns, 2014); for example, a smiling 
mouth predicts creases around the eyes (so-called ‘eye-smile’). Emotion cues may therefore 
augment the binding of facial regions into integrated holistic representations (Gray, Murphy, 
et al., 2017; Johnston, 2011). The effect of facial emotion on the composite face illusion is so 
striking that even subtle expression cues present in ostensibly neutral faces (e.g., pursed lips, 
upturned corners of the mouth) induce significantly stronger illusory distortion when present 
in distractor regions (Gray, Murphy, et al., 2017). 
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Notably, many studies have observed difficulties recognizing facial expressions of emotion in 
those with ASD (Ashwin, Chapman, Colle, & Baron-Cohen, 2006; Harms, Martin, & 
Wallace, 2010; Humphreys, Minshew, Leonard, & Behrmann, 2007; Philip et al., 2010; 
Wallace, Coleman, & Bailey, 2008b). Recent evidence suggests that these deficits may be 
due to the presence of co-occurring alexithymia ('the alexithymia hypothesis'; Bird & Cook, 
2013). Alexithymia is a trait associated with difficulties identifying and describing one’s own 
emotions (Nemiah, Freyberger, & Sifneos, 1976), that also impairs individuals’ ability to 
recognize the emotions of others (Grynberg et al., 2012). Importantly, alexithymia co-occurs 
highly with ASD (for review see Poquérusse, Pastore, Dellantonio, & Esposito, 2018). 
Estimates suggest that as many as 50% of autistic individuals may have clinically relevant 
levels of alexithymia (Berthoz & Hill, 2005; Hill, Berthoz, & Frith, 2004). While the 
alexithymia hypothesis remains a theory, empirical support for this view is accumulating (e.g. 
Cook, Brewer, Shah, & Bird, 2013; Oakley, Brewer, Bird, & Catmur, 2016).  
 
In the present study, we examined whether emotion cues present in the distractor regions of 
composite face arrangements have differential effects on the composite face effects seen in 
typical individuals and those with ASD. Despite being constructed from ostensibly neutral 
faces, many widely used sets of composite face stimuli are rich in unintended emotion cues 
(see Murphy et al., 2017; Figure 5). Given that i) these emotion cues increase the strength of 
the composite face effect in typical individuals (Gray, Murphy, et al., 2017), and ii) many 
autistic individuals experience difficulties recognizing facial expressions (Ashwin et al., 
2006; Harms et al., 2010; Humphreys et al., 2007; Philip et al., 2010; Wallace et al., 2008b), 
we reasoned that autistic samples  may exhibit diminished composite face effects only where 
distractor regions contain – intended or unintended – emotion cues. In other words, autistic 
individuals may only show reduced composite face effects if they are less able to perceive 
subtle signs of emotions in the face halves used to construct composite face stimuli. 
 
Individuals with ASD and matched typical controls completed the ‘incidental’ emotion 
composite face procedure described by Gray and colleagues (2017; Experiment 1). In this 
task, participants judge whether sequentially presented target regions (upper face halves) are 
identical or not, whilst attempting to ignore task-irrelevant distractor regions (lower face 
halves). The distractor regions are always cropped from different facial identities (the so-
called 'original' composite procedure; Murphy et al., 2017; Rossion, 2013). Unlike standard 
matching procedures, however, image morphing is used to vary the emotion content of the 
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distractor region, such that there are three emotion intensity conditions: 1) low emotion cues 
(neutral stimulus), 2) moderate emotion cues (morph of 50% neutral stimulus, 50% emotional 
stimulus), and 3) strong emotion cues (emotional stimulus). As the strength of the emotion 
signal increases, the strength of the composite effect increases, i.e., the distractor regions 
induce greater illusory distortion of the target region, and typical participants’ ability to 
discriminate the target regions decreases (Gray, Murphy, et al., 2017). The modulatory effect 
of emotion intensity is eliminated when composite arrangements are misaligned, indicating 
that the effect is not attributable to response bias or distraction. Should autistic individuals 
exhibit atypical composite effects because of the increased prevalence of emotion processing 
difficulties in this population, the ASD group would not show increases in the size of the 
composite effect with greater levels of distractor emotion. 
 
Previously, the holistic processing of facial emotion has been investigated by examining the 
extent to which an incongruous emotion signal in the distractor region impairs participants’ 
ability to label the emotion depicted in the target half (Calder, Young, Keane, & Dean, 2000). 
This paradigm is poorly-suited for use with autistic individuals, as many – particularly those 
with co-occurring alexithymia – have difficulty labelling and interpreting the emotional 
content of isolated local regions (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997; Oakley et al., 
2016). In the paradigm used here, however, participants are simply required to judge whether 
target regions are identical or not. As there is no requirement to label the emotion in the target 




Twenty individuals with (Mage = 33.95; SDage = 11.39; 3 females) and 29 individuals without2 
(Mage = 35.03; SDage = 10.16; 2 females) a clinical diagnosis of ASD participated in this 
study. The ASD and typical groups did not differ significantly in terms of age [t(47) = .35, p 
= .728], gender [X2(1) = .85, p = .357], or IQ [t(47) = .85, p = .399], measured by the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (Wechsler, 1997) in the ASD group, and the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (Wechsler, 1999) in the typical controls group. Individuals 
with ASD were diagnosed by an independent clinician. The Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule (ADOS-2; Lord et al., 2000) was also used to determine individuals’ current level 
of ASD symptom severity. Of the 20 participants with a clinical diagnosis of ASD, 12 met 
criteria for a classification of ‘autism’, and 8 met the criteria for a classification of ‘autistic 
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spectrum’, according to the ADOS-2. The ASD group also had greater levels of autistic traits 
than the typical group [t(47) = 7.57, p < .001], assessed by the Autism-Spectrum Quotient 
(AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001). Detailed diagnostic 
information can be seen in Table 1. 
 
Levels of alexithymia were measured using the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, 
Taylor, & Parker, 1994), and completed by all autistic participants and all but one participant 
in the typical group. As expected, alexithymia severity was higher in the ASD (M = 60.30, 
SD = 14.89) than in the typical (M = 41.07, SD = 8.14) [t(46) = 5.24, p < .001] group. TAS-
20 scores ranged from 27 to 84 in the ASD group, and from 23 to 56 in the typical group. 
Through the application of the established cut-off, 11 members of the ASD sample were 
classified as having high levels of alexithymia (TAS-20 score > 60), and 9 members were 
classified as having low levels of alexithymia (TAS-20 score < 61). All typical controls were 
classified as having low levels of alexithymia on this basis.  
 
2.2. Procedure  
Composite arrangements were constructed from faces selected from the Radboud Face 
Database (Langner et al., 2010). Target regions (upper face halves3) were cropped from 18 
male identities with neutral expressions. Distractor regions (lower face halves) were cropped 
from 3 male identities depicting happy or angry expressions, at low (0%), moderate (50%), 
and strong (100%) intensity. The moderate intensity distractor region was created by 
blending the low and strong intensity expressions using Morpheus Photo Morpher Version 
3.11 (Morpheus Software, Indianapolis, IN). When combined, composite face arrangements 
subtended approximately 6° vertically when viewed from a distance of 58 cm. Misaligned 
composites were created by introducing a horizontal offset of 3°. In both alignment 
conditions, a small vertical gap of ~ 4 pixels was placed between the face halves (see Rossion 
& Retter, 2015). 
 
Each trial began with a fixation point, followed by two composite arrangements presented 
sequentially for 200ms each. A mask of high-contrast grey-scale ovals was presented during 
the 1000ms inter-stimulus-interval (Figure 1). Following the offset of the second composite 
arrangement, participants were prompted to respond with a button press, to indicate whether 
the two target regions were identical or not (‘same’ or ‘different’). In keeping with the 
original composite procedure, the two distractor regions used on a given trial always differed 
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in their identity. The two distractors always had the same emotional intensity (0%, 50%, 
100%). Where an emotion signal was present, they differed in emotional content (either 
happy or angry). The first and second composite arrangements were equally likely to have 
happy and angry distractor regions. In total, there were 216 experimental trials: 18 target 
pairs × 2 target types (same, different) × 2 alignment types (aligned, misaligned) × 3 levels of 
emotion intensity (0%, 50%, 100%). Trial type was randomly interleaved within four blocks 




Where possible, we also assessed the face recognition ability of the autistic participants 
(Table 1). Nineteen of the 20 ASD participants completed the Cambridge Face Memory Test 
(CFMT; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006a) and seventeen participants with ASD completed the 
20-Item Prosopagnosia Index (PI20; Shah, Gaule, Sowden, Bird, & Cook, 2015). For 
comparison, the scores of the current ASD group on these measures were compared to the 
sample of 142 typical adult participants (Mage = 29.2 years, SDage = 11.9 years) previously 
described by Gray, Bird & Cook (2017; Experiment 1). The ASD group showed significant 
evidence of face recognition difficulties relative to this comparison group on both the CFMT 
[t(159) = 4.544, p < .001], and the PI20 [t(157) = 5.059, p < .001]. Participants’ scores on the 
PI20 and CFMT correlated significantly (r = - 61, p = .010).  
 
We also measured the emotion recognition ability of 17 of the 20 autistic individuals using a 
binary categorization procedure (for full details see Brewer, Biotti, Bird, & Cook, 2017). 
Each trial presented a single expression stimulus (1200 ms) drawn from morph-continua that 
blended pairs of emotional facial expressions. One continuum blended an expression that was 
20% anger / 80% disgust with an expression that was 80% anger / 20% disgust. The other, 
blended an expression that was 20% fear / 80% sadness with an expression that was 80% fear 
/ 20% sadness. Each continuum comprised seven levels that varied the strength of the 
emotion signal in increments of 10%. On each trial participants were asked to make a binary 
categorization judgement (was the expression best classified as disgust or anger; sadness or 
fear). The level of decision noise associated with their categorization judgements was 
inferred from the slopes of the resulting psychometric functions, whereby higher values 






When analyzing data from the original matching procedure, the composite face effect is 
evidenced by a disproportionate reduction in accuracy on ‘same’ target trials, relative to 
‘different’ trials (e.g., Le Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, & Brent, 2004). Because distractor 
regions differ, perceptual fusion of the distractor and target alters how observers perceive the 
target and makes it more difficult to see that sequentially presented target halves are identical. 
The detrimental effects of distractor, and any interaction with emotion, should be greatly 
reduced in the misaligned condition, where the composite illusion manifests less strongly. 
 
Participants’ matching accuracy (% correct) was analyzed using ANOVA with Alignment 
(aligned, misaligned), Emotion Intensity (0%, 50%, 100%), and Target Type (same, 
different) as within-participants factors, and Group (ASD, typical) as a between-participants 
factor (Table 2, Figure 2). This analysis revealed a significant Alignment × Target Type 
interaction [F(1,47) = 12.82, p = .001, η2 = .214] characteristic of the composite face effect. 
Generally, performance on same trials was worse in the aligned condition (where the illusion 
hampers correct responding) than in the misaligned condition (where observers are free of the 
illusory interference) [t(48) = 3.28, p = .002]. In contrast, performance on different trials was 
better for aligned than misaligned stimuli [t(48) = 2.29, p = .027]. 
 
It was evident, however, that the Alignment × Target Type interaction varied as a function of 
Emotion Intensity [F(2,94) = 8.77, p < .001, η2 = .157], as observed previously by Gray and 
colleagues (2017). Simple Alignment × Target Type interactions were observed in the 50% 
emotion condition [F(1,47) = 11.08, p = .002, η2 = .191], and in the 100% emotion condition 
[F(1,47) = 14.54, p < .001, η2 = .236], but not in the 0% emotion condition [F(1,47) = .016, p 
= .901, η2 < .001]. The Alignment × Target Type × Emotion Intensity interaction was driven 
by differences between the 0% emotion condition and both the 50% emotion condition 
[F(1,47) = 10.73, p = .003, η2 = .186], and the 100% emotion condition [F(1,47) = 13.80, p = 
.001, η2 = .227]. The size of the composite effect was similar in the 50% and 100% emotion 
conditions [F(1,47) = .003, p = .953, η2 < .001].  
 
Simple contrasts indicated that, in the 0% emotion condition, there was no effect of alignment 
in either the same [t(48) = 1.14, p = .262] or different [t(48) = 1.00, p = .322] trials. In the 
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50% emotion condition, however, there was clear evidence of a composite effect, whereby an 
effect of alignment was found in the same [t(48) = 3.17, p = .003], but not the different [t(48) 
= 1.60, p = .116], trials. A composite effect was also observed in the 100% emotion 
condition; there was again an effect of alignment in the same [t(48) = 4.14, p < .001], but not 
different [t(48) = 1.83, p = .074], trials. These significant contrasts survive Bonferroni 
correction (they remain significant at α = .008). 
 
Crucially, there was no evidence that ASD is associated with reduced composite effects. 
There was not a significant main effect of ASD group [F(1,47) = 2.48, p = .122, η2 = .050] 
and neither the Alignment × Target Type interaction [F(1,94) = .17, p = .681], nor the 
Alignment × Target Type × Emotion Intensity interaction [F(2,94) = .005, p = .995, η2 < 
.001] varied as a function of Group. Similarly, Group did not interact with the size of the 
composite effect at any of the three levels of Emotion Intensity when considered separately 
(all ps > .72). The only effect of Group was an Alignment × Emotion Intensity × Group 
interaction [F(2,94) = 3.72, p = .028, η2 = .073]. The ASD participants showed a trend toward 
better discrimination for aligned trials at 0% emotion intensity, that was not seen in the other 
emotion conditions (50%, 100%), and was not exhibited by the typical participants at any 
level of emotion intensity. This effect was not predicted and is difficult to interpret with 
confidence. However, the lack of an interaction with Trial Type suggests it has little to do 





Next, we analyzed the data from the typical (N = 29) and ASD (N = 20) groups separately, 
using a three-way ANOVA with Alignment, Target Type, and Emotion Intensity as within-
subjects factors. The analyses revealed significant evidence of the standard composite effect 
(Alignment × Target Type interaction) in both the typical [F(1,28) = 7.09, p = .013, η2 = 
.202] and ASD [F(1,19) = 5.63, p = .028, η2 = .229] groups. We observed a significant 
Alignment × Target Type × Emotion Intensity interaction in the typical group [F(2,56) = 
6.46, p = .003, η2 = .187], replicating the findings of Gray et al. (2017). For the typical 
observers, we saw Alignment × Trial type interactions at 50% [F(1,28) = 7.12, p = .013, η2 = 
.213], and 100% [F(1,28) = 8.67, p = .006, η2 = .236] emotion intensities, but not for 0% 
intensity [F(1,28) = .05, p = .824, η2 = .002]. The Alignment × Target Type × Emotion 
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Intensity interaction also approached significance in the ASD group [F(2,38) = 2.97, p = 
.063, η2 = .135]. The autistic observers exhibited a strong trend for the Alignment × Trial 
type interaction at 50% emotion intensity [F(1,19) = 4.24, p = .053, η2 = .182], and a 
significant Alignment × Trial type interaction at 100% intensity [F(1,19) = 6.05, p = 
.024, η2 = .241], but not for 0% intensity [F(1,19) = .10, p = .761, η2 = .005]. Thus, the 
pattern of results was very similar in the two groups separately. 
 
Finally, we sought to examine whether face recognition ability, emotion categorization 
ability, and alexithymia, were related to individual differences in composite effect 
susceptibility. In the past, different authors have used different methods to quantify the 
strength of the effect shown by individual participants. However, having utilised three 
different methods of quantifying the effect, we found no relationship between individuals’ 
susceptibility and their PI20 scores (all rs < .27, all ps > .31), their CFMT scores (all rs < .42, 
all ps > .075), their emotion categorization decision noise (all rs < .39, all ps > .13), or their 
score on the TAS-20 scores (all rs <.35, all ps > .135). A full description of the correlational 
analyses is provided as supplementary online material.  
 
4. Discussion 
The current study sought to determine whether facial emotion cues differentially modulate 
the strength of the composite face illusion in typical individuals and those with ASD. Given 
that difficulties recognizing and interpreting facial emotion are more common in individuals 
with ASD than those without ASD and previous findings suggest that the strength of 
composite face effects are greatly influenced by the presence of unintended emotion cues in 
composite arrangements (Gray, Murphy, et al., 2017), we reasoned that individuals with ASD 
may exhibit atypical composite face effects where distractor regions are rich in emotion cues. 
Having measured composite effects using distractor regions that varied systematically in their 
emotion strength, we found no evidence for this possibility; individuals with and without 
ASD showed extremely similar composite face effects at intermediate and strong levels of 
distractor emotion. As expected, the composite effects seen in both groups were eliminated 
when the distractor and target regions were misaligned, indicating that the effects observed 
were both quantitatively and qualitatively similar. Notably, individual differences in 
composite effect susceptibility seen in the autistic individuals were unrelated to their level of 
alexithymia or emotion categorization ability.   
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4.1 Implications for social perception in ASD 
There has been considerable speculation that a failure to process faces holistically may 
underlie the face perception deficits seen in ASD (Behrmann, Avidan, et al., 2006; 
Behrmann, Thomas, et al., 2006; Happé, 1999; Happé & Frith, 2006). In this context, it is 
critical to determine whether autistic individuals exhibit diminished susceptibility to the 
composite face illusion, regarded as a key marker of holistic face processing (Murphy et al., 
2017; Rossion, 2013). To date, previous studies have yielded mixed findings; some authors 
have reported evidence of atypical composite effects in this population (Gauthier et al., 2009; 
Teunisse & de Gelder, 2003), while others have described normal susceptibility (Nishimura 
et al., 2008; Ventura et al., 2018). The present findings of clear and comparable composite 
face effects in typical and ASD groups accord with those of Nishimura and colleagues (2008) 
and Ventura and Colleagues (2017). Contrary to the view that face perception deficits seen in 
ASD reflect aberrant holistic processing (Behrmann, Avidan, et al., 2006; Behrmann, 
Thomas, et al., 2006; Happé, 1999; Happé & Frith, 2006), these results indicate that the 
integration processes measured by this illusion are intact in individuals with ASD.  
 
At first glance, this conclusion appears to contradict the findings of Teunisse & de Gelder 
(2003) and Gauthier and colleagues (2009). Close examination of these studies, however, 
suggests that neither provides strong evidence for diminished composite face effects in ASD. 
Although Teunisse & de Gelder (2003) report that their ASD sample (N = 17) failed to show 
a composite face effect, their composite task also failed to produce strong composite face 
effects in typical individuals. Typical children (aged 9-10 years) failed to show evidence of a 
composite effect, either in their RT or accuracy data, and typical adults showed a composite 
effect only in their RT data. The problems interpreting this result are compounded by the lack 
of a direct group comparison. The findings of Gauthier and Colleagues (2009) are curious 
insofar as the key difference between typical individuals and those with ASD (N = 24) is seen 
in the misaligned condition. Although the autistic individuals were poorer at the matching 
task in all conditions, they showed the typical modulation by distractor congruence in the 
aligned condition. Unlike the typical group, however, the ASD group also showed a 
significant congruency effect in the misaligned condition. Rather than indicate diminished 
holistic face processing, this finding suggests that under some conditions, autistic individuals 




The composite face effect appears to be a product of life-long exposure to the statistical 
regularities present in faces; for example, expressions of happiness are associated with 
characteristic patterns of change around the eyes and mouth, contingencies between so-called 
“eye-smile” and “mouth-smile”. The visual system seems to use these regularities to set up 
strong predictions about the likely content of the target region of a composite arrangement, 
given the content of the task-irrelevant region. Our results suggest that autistic individuals 
(regardless of their level of alexithymia) are sensitive to these statistical regularities and are 
able to use this covariation to derive perceptual predictions.  
 
Where observed, poor emotion recognition in autistic individuals may instead reflect 
difficulties interpreting the emotional content of expression percepts. The suggestion that 
expression recognition deficits in ASD are decisional – not apperceptive – accords with 
findings that autistic individuals who do exhibit emotion labeling impairments can still detect 
physical differences between facial expressions (Cook et al., 2013), and with the fact that 
affective deficits, where observed, extend to other types of affective stimuli including body 
movements and vocal cues (Heaton et al., 2012; Philip et al., 2010). 
 
The present findings add to a growing body of evidence suggesting that individuals with ASD 
often process global configuration typically (Van der Hallen, Evers, Brewaeys, Van den 
Noortgate, & Wagemans, 2015). For example, our findings align closely with a recent study 
that described typical integration of emotion cues from across the face and body in autistic 
individuals (Brewer et al., 2017). Similarly, many autistic individuals appear to derive 
accurate percepts of global motion (Manning, Tibber, Charman, Dakin, & Pellicano, 2015), 
and exhibit typical susceptibility to simple visual illusions induced by context (Manning, 
Morgan, Allen, & Pellicano, 2017). Individuals with ASD are also affected typically by the 
gestalt properties of to-be-copied target patterns (Smith, Kenny, Rudnicka, Briscoe, & 
Pellicano, 2016). When instructed to identify the global configuration of hierarchical local-
global stimuli (e.g. ‘Navon’ letter arrays), recent evidence also suggests that individuals with 
ASD are often unimpaired (Koldewyn et al., 2013). Taken with the current findings, this 
evidence suggests that global processing abilities may not always be compromised in ASD. 
 
4.2 Implications for the composite face illusion 
There has been considerable debate about the functional significance of the composite face 
illusion (Murphy et al., 2017; Rossion, 2013). While some authors have claimed that the 
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integration processes responsible for this illusion are closely related to face recognition 
ability (DeGutis, Wilmer, Mercado, & Cohan, 2013; Richler et al., 2011), others have 
suggested there may be little or no relationship (Konar et al., 2010; Murphy & Cook, 2017; 
Rezlescu et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2012). Typical composite face effects suggest that the 
locus of the face recognition difficulties seen in autism lies elsewhere in the face processing 
stream. Future research should continue to investigate the origin of these deficits, potentially 
aberrant face learning (Ipser et al., 2016) or atypical processing of facial motion (O'Brien et 
al., 2014). 
 
Our results accord closely with recent findings that the majority of individuals with 
developmental prosopagnosia (a related neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by 
lifelong face recognition difficulties; Cook & Biotti, 2016; Duchaine & Nakayama, 2006b) 
also appear to show typical susceptibility to the composite face illusion (Biotti et al., 2017; 
Le Grand et al., 2006; Ulrich et al., 2017). Together, these findings support the view that the 
composite face illusion is a marker of extremely resilient face processing (Murphy et al., 
2017), disrupted only by catastrophic damage to the face processing stream, such as that seen 
in adults who acquire prosopagnosia following brain injury (e.g., Busigny et al., 2014).  
 
The present findings closely replicate those of Gray and colleagues (2017; Experiment 1). In 
both studies, stronger composite effects were observed as the strength of the emotion signal 
in the distractor increased. These results highlight the effect that emotion cues can have on 
the composite face illusion. While we failed to observe a composite effect in the 0% emotion 
condition (also reported by Gray and colleagues), we do not believe facial emotion is a 
necessary condition for the composite face illusion. The fact that the composite illusion alters 
individuals’ perception of identity (Young et al., 1987), age (Hole & George, 2011), and 
gender (Baudouin & Humphreys, 2006) suggests that the covariation of facial structure is a 
source of perceptual prediction, independent of facial expression. Relative to the striking 
illusory effects induced by emotion cues, however, the distortion induced by facial structure 
alone may be relatively subtle. When emotional and neutral distractors are interleaved within 
blocks, the illusory distortion of target regions induced by high-emotion distractors may 
overshadow the illusory effects attributable to facial structure, causing observers to alter their 
decision criteria. As a result, instances of subtle structural distortion seen in the 0% emotion 




In summary, we found that facial emotion cues modulate the strength of the composite face 
illusion to the same degree in typical individuals and those with ASD. The composite effects 
seen in the ASD group were quantitatively and qualitatively similar, suggestive of intact 
holistic processing. These findings indicate that autistic individuals are sensitive to the 
statistical regularities in facial expressions, despite that fact that some autistic individuals 
experience difficulty interpreting emotional expressions, and argue against the view that 
aberrant holistic processing is responsible for atypical face perception in this population.  
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Footnotes 
1We use the term ‘autistic people’ as research indicates that it is preferred by many 
individuals with ASD, as well as using terms preferred by clinicians, such as ‘individuals 
with ASD’ (Kenny et al., 2016). 
 
2Thirty typical observers were tested, however one participant was excluded having failed to 
follow task instructions.  
 
3Under free-viewing conditions, some autistic people may spontaneously fixate on the eye-
region less often than controls. Importantly, however, individuals with autism (especially 
high-functioning cases) appear able to fixate eye-regions typically when instructed to do so 
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Figure 1. The incidental emotion composite face procedure. Image morphing is used to vary 
the emotion content of the distractor region. As the strength of the emotion signal increases, 
the distractor region induces greater illusory distortion of the target region, and participants’ 






Figure 2. Accuracy scores in the aligned and misaligned conditions on trials when target 
halves were the same and different for (a) typical and (b) ASD samples. Error bars indicate 















Classification Sex Age AQ 
Full-Scale 





1 7 Autism Spectrum M 38 17 125 27 65% 56 8% 7% 
2 10 Autism F 22 20 121 44 60% 60 9% 5% 
3 11 Autism M 42 33 117 36 83% 63 1% 22% 
4 8 Autism Spectrum M 18 21 107 73 51% 40 6% 7% 
5 15 Autism F 52 45 116 69 78% 32 10% 12% 
6 11 Autism M 31 37 118 38 54% 46 7% 6% 
7 11 Autism M 37 35 99 56 86% 33 - - 
8 10 Autism M 35 46 112 54 88% 36 1% 1% 
9 14 Autism M 38 23 78 56 63% - - - 
10 7 Autism Spectrum M 61 45 132 61 65% 65 1% 1% 
11 9 Autism Spectrum M 33 35 128 60 82% 45 18% 52% 
12 9 Autism Spectrum M 25 39 133 61 61% 54 16% 37% 
13 8 Autism Spectrum F 21 46 93 81 74% - 17% 37% 
14 9 Autism M 19 31 92 60 - - 21% 11% 
15 10 Autism M 21 35 107 72 72% 53 7% 18% 
16 14 Autism M 49 50 121 84 46% 79 8% 10% 
17 10 Autism M 33 41 122 67 53% 60 - - 
18 7 Autism Spectrum M 38 40 116 71 78% 50 4% 7% 
19 12 Autism M 31 48 107 64 54% 60 13% 12% 
20 8 Autism Spectrum M 35 36 108 72 49% 71 9% 7% 
















































Table 2. Main and interaction effects in the Target Type (same, different) × Alignment (aligned, misaligned)  
× Emotion Intensity (0%, 50%, 100%) × Group (ASD, typical) ANOVA.  
Effect F p  η2 
Main effect of Target Type .002 .968 < .001 
Main effect of Alignment 1.58 .214 .033 
Main effect of Emotion Intensity 6.23 .005 .117 
Main effect of Group 2.48 .122 .050 
Target Type × Alignment 12.82 .001 .214 
Target Type × Emotion Intensity 12.19 < .001 .206 
Target Type × Group .018 .894 < .001 
Alignment × Emotion Intensity 5.70 .005 .108 
Alignment × Group 1.04 .313 .022 
Emotion Intensity × Group 1.05 .353 .022 
Target Type × Alignment × Emotion Intensity 8.77 < .001 .157 
Target Type × Alignment × Group .17 .681 .004 
Target Type × Emotion Intensity × Group .223 .797 .005 
Alignment × Emotion Intensity × Group 3.72 .030 .073 












Face perception in autism spectrum disorder:  
Modulation of holistic processing by facial emotion 
 




A number of approaches have been taken in order to estimate the magnitude of the face 
composite effect, for use in individual differences analyses. Below we describe a number of 
methods that can be used to quantify the composite effect, and report the relationship 
between each of these estimates and a) performance on the emotion recognition tasks, b) PI20 
scores, c) CFMT scores (all in the ASD sample), and d) alexithymia (in the full sample and 
the ASD and typical groups separately). 
 
Method 1: Same misaligned – same aligned 
Some authors have estimated the magnitude of the composite effect by taking the difference 
between accuracy scores in the misaligned and aligned trials, specifically on trials where the 
two upper halves were the same (e.g. Heering, Houthuys, & Rossion, 2007; Le Grand et al., 
2006; Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung, & Caldara, 2006). Using this variable, we found no 
relationship between the magnitude of the composite effect measure and any individual 
difference measure (see table S1). 
 
Table S1. Correlations between magnitude of the composite effect estimated by same 
misaligned accuracy – same aligned accuracy and PI20 scores, CFMT scores, emotion 
recognition task performance, and alexithymia. 
 
Variable Sample Emotion Level r p 
PI20 score ASD group 0% -.24 .344 
50% -.07 .791 
100% -.14 .603 
CFMT score ASD group 0% .30 .216 
50% .06 .822 
100% -.41 .081 
Sadness-fear 
decision noise 
ASD group 0% -.38 .133 
50% -.11 .689 
100% .17 .516 
Disgust-anger 
decision noise 
ASD group 0% -.18 .485 
50% -.25 .329 
100% .05 .841 
TAS-20 score Full sample 0% -.09 .551 
50% .17 .244 
100% .08 .575 
ASD group 0% .09 .704 
50% .07 .776 
100% .19 .413 
TD group 0% .01 .968 
50% .22 .252 




Method 2: Normalised composite effect 
Others have estimated the composite effect magnitude using a ‘normalised composite effect’, 
calculated as the difference between accuracy scores in the aligned and misaligned 
conditions, divided by the sum of these accuracy scores, again only using trials where the 
targets are the same (De Heering & Rossion, 2008; Wang, Li, Fang, Tian, & Liu, 2012). This 
is calculated using the equation (misaligned same - aligned same)/ (misaligned same + 
aligned same). Using this variable, we again found no relationship with any of the individual 
difference variables (see table S2). 
 
Table S2. Correlations between normalised composite effect and PI20 scores, CFMT scores, 
emotion recognition task performance, and alexithymia. 
 
Variable Sample Emotion Level r p 
PI20 score ASD group 0% -.26 .314 
50% -.07 .783 
100% -.09 .727 
CFMT score ASD group 0% .31 .204 
50% <.01 .987 
100% -.37 .120 
Sadness-fear 
decision noise 
ASD group 0% -.33 .197 
50% <.01 .995 
100% .21 .429 
Disgust-anger 
decision noise 
ASD group 0% -.15 .577 
50% -.22 .398 
100% .10 .694 
TAS-20 score Full sample 0% -.08 .575 
50% .17 .248 
100% .10 .506 
ASD group 0% .13 .592 
50% .05 .850 
100% .22 .355 
TD group 0% .06 .758 
50% .26 .191 
100% .06 .765 
 
 
Method 3: Difference of differences 
An alternative way to estimate the size of the composite effect, which is closer to the ideal 
Alignment × Target Type × Emotion Intensity interaction, is to calculate the alignment*target 
type interaction in each individual and investigate this at each level of emotion intensity. This 
was calculated by taking a ‘difference of differences’ score for each individual, calculated 
using the equation (misaligned different – aligned different) – (misaligned same – aligned 
same). In line with the previous two analyses, there was no relationship with individual 






Table S3. Correlations between magnitude of the composite effect estimated by the 
difference of differences measure and PI20 scores, CFMT scores, emotion recognition task 
performance, and alexithymia. 
 
Variable Sample Emotion Level r p 
PI20 score ASD group 0% .25 .336 
50% .16 .540 
100% .18 .481 
CFMT score ASD group 0% -.21 .384 
50% .19 .446 
100% .41 .078 
Sadness-fear 
decision noise 
ASD group 0% -.03 .897 
50% -.11 .674 
100% -.14 .595 
Disgust-anger 
decision noise 
ASD group 0% .17 .515 
50% .21 .424 
100% -.12 .661 
TAS-20 score Full sample 0% -.19 .191 
50% .17 .249 
100% -.19 .198 
ASD group 0% -.16 .498 
50% -.23 .340 
100% -.34 .137 
TD group 0% -.28 .150 
50% .13 .520 
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